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Differentiating Among International Investment Disputes
Julie A. Maupin1
Abstract: Can investor-state arbitration tribunals, which exercise jurisdiction
over limited claims involving discrete parties, render awards that deliver
individualized justice while also promoting systemic fairness, predictability and
coherence? The answer, I argue, is a qualified yes – provided that the methods
employed are tailored to the particular characteristics of each dispute. Using three
well-known investment arbitrations as case studies, I illustrate that investor-state
disputes vary widely in terms of their socio-legal, territorial, and political impacts.
Significant variances along these three dimensions call for a differentiated
approach to investor-state dispute resolution. I outline what such an approach
might look like and analyze how much room there is to implement it within the
current framework of the regime. While some improvements can be made
through arbitrator-led efforts in the short term, what is needed in the medium term
is a systemic restructuring that funnels different classes of investor-state claims
into different types of dispute resolution mechanisms that better comport with the
claims’ underlying characteristics.
I.

Introduction

It is a basic truism of all legal decision-making that each case must be decided on its own terms.
Failing this, there is a real risk that the parties to a particular dispute will receive no justice.
Nevertheless, there is an equally basic countervailing truism inherent in the very concept of law
– namely, the principle that like cases should be decided alike. Otherwise, either the legal
system itself or the adjudicators who steward it will be regarded as arbitrary and unfair.
International investment lawyers, like their counterparts in every other field of law, must contend
with both of these norms.2 They must find sensible means of distinguishing between cases
which are truly different in core respects while also recognizing similarities between cases which
share certain fundamental commonalities. They must, in other words, differentiate among
disputes.
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The task is easier said than done. In a legal system as vast as the international investment
regime, all manner of possible disputes can arise. A foreign investor’s cause of action against its
host state can arise from a simple breach of contract or an outrageous instance of discriminatory
treatment. The jurisdictional basis for the claim may lie in a contract, a domestic statute, a
bilateral or regional treaty, or some combination of the four. Investor-state claims can be
brought by individual foreign investors acting separately or by thousands acting jointly. The list
of states’ available defenses to investor-state claims includes contractual entitlement, public
health, environmental protection, prudential financial regulation, military necessity, and
everything in between.
As to impact, the consequences of a particular state’s maligned
governmental action may fall entirely upon a single foreign investor or be felt, in both positive
and negative ways, across society at large – sometimes even beyond the state’s own borders.
Against this backdrop, it would seem surprising if all international legal disputes between foreign
investors and their host states could be resolved by adjudicators in a monolithic manner.
Happily, neither the complexity of international investment disputes nor their important societal
implications has escaped the notice of commentators. In recent years, a prolific group of
scholars has painstakingly documented the ways in which disputes between investors and foreign
sovereigns often differ from the thousands of garden variety cross-border commercial disputes
that arise every year in our globalized economy, and also from the dozens of classical public
international law disputes that have been arbitrated between sovereign states over the past few
centuries.
Van Harten, Schneiderman, Montt, and Schill have focused particular attention on what they
term the ‘public law’ dimensions of contemporary investment disputes.3 They point out that
determining whether and how much a sovereign must compensate a foreign investor for a
reduction in profits occasioned by a generally applicable regulatory measure (think
environmental, labor, or health regulations) is more akin to an administrative or constitutional
law-style review of state action than it is to ordinary commercial arbitration. In parallel with this
conceptually-oriented public law crowd, a second4 group of scholars and civil society advocates
has raised difficult normative questions concerning the suitability of arbitration as a mechanism
for resolving such highly charged ‘regulatory disputes’. They express concern over the lack of
legitimacy and accountability inherent in a system in which one-off panels of privately appointed
arbitrators sit in judgment over states’ exercise of their sovereign regulatory powers.5
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A third strand of the literature, in turn, attempts to respond to international investment law’s
‘public law challenge’ and its corresponding ‘legitimacy crisis’ in a prescriptive, if perhaps
sometimes idealistic, manner. Proposed solutions to the regime’s problems have included major
re-writes of states’ existing investment treaty obligations,6 the importation of interpretive devices
(like proportionality and balancing tests) from other national and international adjudicative
traditions,7 and the introduction of a post-award system of review.8 The common thread among
all of these proposals is the hope that they might encourage adjudicators to reach more socially
and politically acceptable outcomes in individual disputes.
Most recently, the ongoing conceptual, normative, and prescriptive debates have touched off a
burgeoning fourth wave of empirically grounded research which is shaping up along two basic
lines of inquiry. One aims at identifying precisely who makes up the pool of international
investment arbitrators, what makes them tick, and whether they are professionally equipped and
personally disposed to discharge the politically fraught duties they are now assuming.9 Such
sticky wicket questions arise both under the existing investment arbitration system and under
many of the reform proposals presently being discussed by the regime’s supporters and critics.
The second line of empirical inquiry aims to determine, once and for all, whether there is even
anything in the current international investment law regime worth reforming – a question usually
framed in terms of the search for demonstrable benefits for host states.10
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bottom-up – from practice to theory – rather than the other way around. My goals are concrete
and threefold: first, to highlight the diversity of characteristics exhibited by actual investor-state
disputes; second, to construct a conceptual framework that organizes these diverse characteristics
in a manner that sheds light on which ones are most salient and why; and third, to explore how
adopting a differentiated (as opposed to one-size-fits-all) approach to investor-state dispute
settlement can improve the functioning of the international investment law regime and help to
obviate some – though by no means all – of the scholarly and civil society criticisms that have
been levied against it.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds in four parts. Part II sets the stage with a brief
introduction to the heterogeneity of investor-state disputes. Part III makes the case for
differentiation as a conceptual approach to investor-state dispute resolution in light of this
heterogeneity. In concrete terms, I propose that all international investment disputes be
differentiated from the outset along three dimensions: the socio-legal, the territorial, and the
political. I then pass three well-known disputes through the lens of my proposed differentiation
analysis in Part IV. With each case study, I evaluate how much room there is within the existing
confines of the regime for arbitrators to tailor their interpretive and procedural practices in
response to the salient features of the particular dispute. I also point out areas in which broader
systemic reforms are needed in order to empower arbitrators to do so more effectively. Part V
concludes with a sketch of possible differentiated approaches to addressing some of international
investment law’s most troubling conundrums.
II.

The heterogeneity of investor-state disputes

From the outset, building up a methodology of differentiation requires paying close attention to
the tremendous diversity of international investment disputes and the legal instruments under
which they arise. This is necessary because, as alluded to in the introduction to this chapter, the
phrase ‘international investment law’ covers quite a bit of ground. Consider, by way of
illustration, the following three instances of actual investor-state dispute resolution proceedings.
A. Malaysian Historical Salvors
In the original, contract-based version of this dispute, the basic complaint alleged that the
underlying contract entitled the foreign claimant to 70% of the profits earned from the sale of all
historical artifacts salvaged from a sunken marine vessel located within Malaysian territorial
waters. The government of Malaysia, however, paid out only 40%.11 The action was thus one
for recovery of the difference. It is noteworthy that the legal instrument underlying the dispute
(the contract) was unique to the parties, its subject matter was of concern only to them, and no
one else appears to have had any involvement with or interest in any facet of the proceedings.12
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Of course, the fact that one of the disputing parties was a sovereign meant that the financial
consequences of any adverse decision would lead to a modest reduction in the value of the public
fisc. But as the funds in question would never even have entered the public fisc absent the
salvage efforts undertaken by the claimants pursuant to the contract, there could be little concern
that an award against the government would unduly burden Malaysian taxpayers.
In short, Malaysian Historical Salvors exemplifies the simplest possible type of investor-state
dispute. As a straightforward commercial claim, it seems like the type of dispute it would be
quite proper for an adjudicator to decide on its own terms, applying ordinary commercial dispute
resolution principles. Few special concerns about the legitimacy of such a proceeding are likely
to arise – provided, of course, that standard minimum requirements of procedural fairness are
met and the parties’ autonomous contractual stipulations are respected.13
B. Suez, SGAB, & Vivendi v Argentina
Turning next to a second illustration, the Suez case too involved a specific contract between
some foreign investors and their host state.14 Here, however, the subject matter of the contract
involved the privatization of a basic public service, namely the water and sewerage system
serving the city of Buenos Aires. As is by now well-known, the contract was concluded at a time
when the Argentine peso was pegged at a rate of one-to-one with the US dollar. The contract
hedged against the possibility of future currency devaluation by giving the concessionaires the
right to calculate consumer water tariffs in US dollars and then convert them to Argentine
pesos.15 When the onset of Argentina’s 2000-2001 economic crisis indeed forced the
government to abandon its currency board, the peso fell 70% overnight. The upshot of the
contractual pass-through provision, under the circumstances, was that massive price increases
were slated to render tap water unaffordable to many, if not most, of the eight million people
living within the concessionaires’ geographical service area. Not surprisingly, the government
issued a moratorium on price increases in all basic services sectors and called for the mandatory
re-negotiation of all public utility contracts. The investors responded by filing investment treaty
claims against the government of Argentina, claiming compensation for the full amount of the
originally stipulated US dollar rate of return.
As in Malaysian Historical Salvors, this dispute again arises out of a contractual investor-state
relationship of a commercial nature. But even a cursory consideration reveals that additional
Salvors as an example simply because, unlike most contract-based disputes, the subsequent treaty-based proceedings
made the underlying contractual dispute a matter of public record.
13
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considerations should enter into the dispute resolution process above and beyond the basic
concern for procedural fairness to the disputing parties. Common sense dictates that some
account must be taken of the rights and interests of the eight million people whose access to
affordable drinking water sits at the core of the complaint. The subject matter, in other words,
matters a great deal.
Suppose one then expands the analysis to consider the fact that this dispute involved not only
contractual claims and defenses but also bilateral treaty-based claims and defenses as well as
claims and defenses based on multilateral human rights treaties and general international law.
Next add in the fact that this case was merely one of 41 parallel claims brought against Argentina
in consequence of its economic crisis – many of which involved public service concession
contracts and the sum total of which, when taken together, reportedly exceeded the government
fisc. Clearly, the universe of difficult legal and factual considerations begins to expand rapidly.
For purposes of analytical perspicuity, however, it may be useful to walk this complexity back a
bit and first consider some of the treaty-based complications separately, without the added
entanglement of a specific investor-state contractual relationship.
C. Victims of the Stanford Ponzi Scheme
As a third illustration, the growing category of cases known as ‘regulatory disputes’ deserves
attention. Such disputes fall at the extreme end of the investor-state dispute spectrum. In one of
the latest examples, a group of Central American investors has submitted a notice of intent to
submit an arbitration claim against the US government under the Dominican Republic-Central
America-United States Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA).16 The basic allegation is that the
Texas branch office of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) repeatedly declined
to expose, regulate, or break up a Texas-based Ponzi scheme due to the fact that most of the
scheme’s investors were not US citizens.17 This nationality-based discrimination, the notice
alleges, caused the Central American investors to suffer massive losses, in violation of the DRCAFTA’s national treatment provision. The investors also allege that the failure of regulatory
oversight violated the treaty’s fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security
provisions.
In this case, there is no contractual relationship between the foreign investors and their host state.
The investment itself does not impact the provision of essential public services. Nor is there any
concern that this claim or others like it might exceed the vast financial resources of the United
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States government.18 Still, numerous difficult questions arise that were entirely absent from the
Malaysian Historical Salvors and Suez et al disputes.
To begin with, does the DR-CAFTA impose upon its contracting states a positive duty to
regulate at some minimally acceptable level? Does it make the contracting states financially
liable to foreign investors for governmental regulatory omissions and failures? If so, under what
circumstances and with what exceptions? Is it relevant, for purposes of the claimants’ national
treatment claims, whether a theoretical US investor in the Stanford Ponzi Scheme could
somehow obtain compensation for the Texas SEC’s oversight failures? 19 Should it matter
(perhaps under a most-favored nation analysis) whether other foreign investors who are not
citizens of DR-CAFTA countries could obtain such compensation?
With respect to the claimants’ ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’
claims, the DR-CAFTA text specifically limits the contracting states’ obligations under these
provisions of the treaty to the customary international law minimum standard of treatment. The
tribunal’s interpretation of the scope of the United States’ obligations under these provisions
therefore matters not only to the Stanford Ponzi Scheme investors and to the United States as
respondent, but also to all other DR-CAFTA states in particular, all other states who are subjects
of these customary international law rules in general,20 and all investors who may invest in any
country that similarly allows investors to directly enforce states’ customary international law
obligations under any investment treaty.21
Given the greatly expanded audience of potentially interested parties, it would seem pertinent to
think through how the dispute might potentially impact upon the rights and duties of the many
other investors and states not before the tribunal. It is of course trite to observe that an arbitral
tribunal’s decision cannot and does not formally bind anyone other than the disputing parties
themselves. No one seriously disputes this position. But by the same token, it is equally
18
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undeniable that the investor-state jurisprudence is dominated by the practice of citing to,
following, and occasionally distinguishing prior arbitral awards.22 To deny the power of
investor-state awards to shape the future behavior of other states, investors, and arbitral tribunals
is to commit the offense we are now told no ostrich has ever actually committed – the proverbial
burying of one’s head in the sand. Some account must be taken of the realities of arbitral
practice.
Summing up, the main point to be gleaned from the Malaysian Historical Salvors, Suez et al, and
Stanford Ponzi Scheme illustrations is not simply that the legal and factual parameters underlying
the three claims are different. Rather, it is that the parameters differ in systematic ways that are
material to any plausible assessment of the three disputes and the manner in which they ought to
be resolved. What is needed, therefore, is a systematic way of identifying which cases are like
and which are different – and for what purposes.
In what follows, I aim to construct a matrix of factors that point to different considerations, and
hence differentiated dispute resolution methodologies, for different types of investor-state
disputes. I contend that this type of schematization exercise will prove useful both within the
realm of dispute resolution and beyond. It sheds light on questions of interpretation but also of
substantive law drafting, and it holds important lessons for overall regime design as well.
III.

The three-dimensionality of investor-state disputes

Turning now to the brass tacks, how might the differing characteristics of investment disputes be
better understood and appreciated in future? I propose that there are three central continuums
along which the basic parameters of most investment disputes can be charted: the socio-legal,
the territorial, and the political. Figuring out where along these three continuums the various
attributes of a particular dispute fall can help draw attention to the special considerations one
might wish to take into account in resolving that dispute. I proceed by explaining the motivating
idea behind each continuum, highlighting the genre of information each attempts to capture, and
suggesting some rough plotting criteria that might be applied when plumbing the contours of
concrete investor-state disputes. I then illustrate how my proposed differentiation methodology
might work in practice by applying it to three well-known disputes.
A. The socio-legal continuum (individual to societal)
The idea behind the socio-legal continuum is to situate each particular investor-state dispute
within the broader context of the social and legal environment in which it arises. This continuum
aims to encapsulate two basic types of information.


First, how large is the claimant pool relative to the total number of actors who were in
some way impacted, whether positively or negatively, by the underlying governmental
action which forms the basis of the complaint?23

22

See e.g. the discussion in Austrian Airlines v. the Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award (9 October 2009),
redacted version, paras 83-84 (asserting that tribunals have a duty to adhere to an arbitral jurisprudence constante
unless there is good reason to depart from it in a specific case).
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Second, to what degree do all of the affected actors enjoy the equal ability to safeguard
their various rights through access to effective legal remedies? 24

These questions may appear rudimentary at first blush. Yet they play an important role in
determining who pays attention to specific investor-state disputes and how those disputes are
perceived by those who do pay attention.
A claim filed by a single claimant – all else being equal – will generally attract less notice than
one filed by thousands.25 Similarly, if the government conduct giving rise to the claim affects no
one but the claimants themselves (as was the case in Malaysian Historical Salvors), then other
actors are far less likely to concern themselves with how the dispute unfolds.26 By contrast,
where a governmental measure impacts upon both claimants and non-claimants and there are
notable discrepancies in the legal protections or remedies afforded to the two groups (as was
arguably the case in Suez et al), the likelihood of not only broader attention but also social
opposition to the arbitration rises.27 These considerations make it prudent to pay attention to
fundamental social and legal dynamics from the outset of each investor-state claim.
B. The territorial continuum (local to transnational)
Shifting to the territorial continuum introduces a second set of considerations. The major
objective of this continuum is to illuminate the geographical breadth of the dispute – as defined
by the dispute’s actual and potential impact rather than by the respondent state’s formal
jurisdictional competence under traditional international law principles. Here again, there are
two relevant lines of inquiry.
(1) How many separate (aka legally unaffiliated) claimants are involved in this case?
(2) Not counting the claimants, how many other foreign or domestic persons, whether natural or juridical, also
suffered or might plausibly claim to have suffered a direct negative impact (harm) as a result of the
government measure(s) that form the basis of this complaint?
(3) Not counting the respondent state’s government itself, how many other foreign or domestic persons,
whether natural or juridical, received or might plausibly claim to have received a direct positive benefit as a
result of the government measure(s) that form the basis of this complaint?
24
By effective legal remedy, I do not mean to suggest that all of the affected actors must be able to adjudicate their
claims before an investor-state arbitral tribunal alongside the investor-claimants. Only that all must have access to
some kind of effective forum for the protection of their rights, and their ability to safeguard their rights through that
forum must not depend upon the outcome of some other forum to which they do not have a right of access (e.g. an
investor-state arbitral tribunal). To get at the essence of this inquiry, one might wish to estimate:
(4) Among all other directly negatively impacted persons who are not claimants in this case (‘N’ from question
2), what percentage has access to a similarly effective adjudicative forum, whether international or
domestic, before which they could potentially lodge the same or similar claims against the government
measure(s) that form the basis of this complaint?
(5) Among all other directly positively impacted persons, both foreign and domestic (‘P’ from question 4),
what percentage might plausibly be considered to have their interests effectively represented by the
respondent government in this case?
25
Of course, all else is never equal. But the point here is not to identify each of the potentially differing features of
investor-state disputes, but rather those which are likely to give rise to the need for differentiated dispute resolution
methodologies. It is my contention that the number of claimants is one such relevant feature (among others).
26
Even if the number of claimants is large (again, all else being equal).
27
Anecdotal evidence of this may be seen in the level of media coverage received by certain disputes relative to
others, as well as in the intensity of the civil society response provoked.
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First, what is the territorial scope of the various positive and negative impacts of the
maligned governmental action that forms the basis of the complaint?



Second, how broad is the reach of the major legal claims and defenses that are likely to
be argued, in terms of their generalizability to actors outside the territorial borders of the
respondent state?

Actual investor-state dispute fact patterns call for myriad different answers to these questions. A
blanket government measure that imposes tighter gaseous emissions standards on factories may
negatively impact the profitability of all factories located within the host state. If there is only
one factory in the country, the negative impact will be highly localized; if there are many, it may
be quite diffuse. On the other side of the balance sheet, since gaseous emissions cross borders
and affect the entire globe, the new regulation may positively impact all human, animal, and
plant life and health not only locally or within the host state but worldwide. This illustrates the
relevance of the factual territorial impact of the government’s challenged measure.
With respect to the legal territorial scope of the dispute, suppose a foreign factory owner files for
arbitration against its host state, claiming compensation for the reduction in profits suffered due
to the hypothetical emissions standard just posited. If the claim is based on a stabilization clause
in a specific contract,28 then the tribunal’s interpretation of the various legal claims and defenses
should not, in theory, affect the legal rights or obligations of anyone not party to the contract. 29
But what if the investor claims that the environmental regulation violates the customary
international law standard of fair and equitable treatment as contained in the DR-CAFTA,
discussed above? In such a case, the arbitral tribunal’s resolution of the disputing parties’ legal
claims and defenses takes on greater import. Although it formally binds only the specific
investor and the host state, the tribunal’s decision carries the potential to alter the way in which
other states and other foreign investors conceive of their similar or identical legal rights and
obligations in future regulatory spats.30 The extraterritorial legal salience of specific investorstate disputes must therefore also factor into any discussion of appropriate methods for resolving
such disputes.
C. The political continuum (commonplace to contested)

28

A stabilization clause is a contractual provision by which a state promises not to alter the regulatory environment
in which the investment operates to the detriment of the profitability of the investment, usually over a defined period
of time (often 30 years).
29
This is not to suggest that stabilization clauses in investor-state contracts are a good idea. My own view is quite to
the contrary. It is difficult to conceive of many situations in which it would practicable, let alone wise, for a
government to prospectively hobble its own ability to respond in a responsible manner to changing economic, social,
political, or environmental circumstances with appropriate, public-regarding regulation. For critiques of
stabilization clauses, see John Ruggie, International Finance Corporation, ‘Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights’
(May 2008), at: http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/media.nsf/Content/Stabilization_Clauses_Human_Rights; Robert Howse,
‘Freezing Government Policy: Stabilization Clauses in Investment Contracts’, 3(1) Investment Treaty News (April
2011), at: http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/iisd_itn_april_2011_en.pdf.
30
Both under the DR-CAFTA and under customary international law, since the former purports to encapsulate the
latter.
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The final continuum that helps point to different dispute resolution considerations for different
types of investor-state disputes is the political continuum. The overriding purpose of the
mapping exercise along this continuum is to convey a sense of the degree to which the basic
features of the dispute itself and the circumstances in which it arises are likely to be viewed as
mundane, ordinary, or commonplace – as opposed to radical, surprising, or contested – by
constituencies who may have or perceive themselves as having an interest in the resolution of the
dispute. This use of the term ‘political’ is admittedly somewhat imprecise. That which is
considered political will necessarily vary across time, across countries, and across individuals
and groups within countries.
Even so, accepting some definitional flexibility may prove useful insofar as it aids the
investment law community in identifying which investor-state disputes, and which aspects of
particular disputes, stand out as potential flashpoints. I submit that there are several key
variables to be noted in this regard, which can be fleshed out by means of the following four
questions:


What is the type and sector of the investment in question?



How novel or audacious are the investor’s claims?



What is the potential individual and aggregate budgetary impact of contemporaneous
investor-state claims upon the host government’s fisc?



What is the economic and political context in which the events giving rise to the dispute
took place?

Taking these in order, the investment sector matters because certain types of business activities
are almost always more politicized than others. One may think of an investment in the extractive
industries in contradistinction to a contract for the construction of a government office
building.31 As to the audacity of investors’ claims, a run-of-the-mill contract claim for nonpayment of services rendered32 is a very different beast, politically speaking, from a claim that a
vague treaty provision promising ‘fair and equitable treatment’ entitles an investor to receive
compensation for lost profits resulting from the enactment of a new emissions regulation.33
Novelty is a related but distinct concept. When investors bring claims of a type that have long
found favor with all manner of domestic and international courts and tribunals,34 few political
eyebrows are raised. By contrast, when an arbitration tribunal ventures into unchartered territory
by countenancing a novel claim that goes far beyond the pale of past practice, the tribunal bears
an additional burden to justify its unprecedented decision. Otherwise, the decision risks being
31

In a similar comparison-across-industries vein, see the discussion of the Malaysian Historical Salvors and Suez
cases, supra, notes 11 to 15 and accompanying text.
32
Malaysian Historical Salvors, ibid..
33
See e.g. Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, NAFTA (UNCITRAL rules), Final Award of the Tribunal
on Jurisdiction and Merits (3 August 2005), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0529.pdf (rejecting a fair and equitable treatment challenge to an environmental law).
34
E.g. straightforward breach of contract claims or claims for the outright expropriation or destruction of property.
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derided as illegitimate by at least some constituencies – potentially at the cost of the
enforceability of the decision.
The proposed budgetary impact consideration may strike many as objectionable at first. After
all, why should a state’s ability to compensate a foreign investor for a breach of its legal
obligations have any bearing upon its duty to pay that investor? Alas, in the real world,
government spending is a hotly political issue – and for good reason. A $300 million award
against the United States in 2006 would have been a proverbial drop in that government’s fiscal
bucket, while the same award against Burkina Faso would have eaten up a third of the
government’s entire budget for that year.35 It seems intuitively obvious that an already cashstrapped government which dutifully cuts back on basic services or raises taxes on its domestic
population in order to transfer large amounts of money to foreign investors will not long remain
in power.36 If this is so, then it is necessary to at least contemplate whether it makes sense to
impose, upon the poorer governments participating in the international investment law system,
the prospect of occasional forced regime change in consequence of heavy financial liability to
foreign investors.37
Finally, in respect of economic and political context, a limitless number of variegated factors can
raise complex considerations in relation to particular disputes. As a rough sweep, it is useful to
simplify things by lumping together into three basic groups the many possible contextual
scenarios out of which investor-state disputes may arise: ordinary times, times of economic
crisis, and times of political crisis or transition. The latter two are not always mutually
exclusive, and each can be further broken down into major and minor crises. But the basic point
is that contextual considerations may play a role – sometimes even a decisive one – in
determining legal rights and obligations in investor-state disputes.38
The Piero Foresti dispute provides an apt illustration of the relevance of this final consideration
within the political continuum.39 In that case, a group of European investors invested in some
South African granite mines in the 1990s, acquiring a set of specified property rights under
certain apartheid-era laws then in place. When the new, democratically elected government later
amended those laws and enacted a series of Black Economic Empowerment initiatives to redress
the previous laws’ discriminatory effects, the investors’ property rights became less valuable.

35

The World Bank Country Report for Burkina Faso (available at: http://data.worldbank.org/country/burkina-faso)
shows general government final consumption expenditures of $1,268,998,089 in current 2006 dollars.
36
Of course, whether or not this would be a good thing may depend on the level of democratic legitimacy enjoyed
by the government in question.
37
It should also be born in mind that such a drastic outcome would undoubtedly reduce the ability of the foreign
investors to actually collect on their arbitration awards.
38
This idea is inherent in the customary international law doctrine of necessity and in contract law doctrines like
impossibility, changed circumstances, and force majeure. Contextual considerations are sometimes also explicitly
incorporated into bilateral investment treaties. See e.g. article XI of the United States-Argentina BIT, at:
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/argentina_us.pdf (allowing deviations from the treaty obligations when
necessary to maintain public order, essential security interests, or international peace and security); article 20 of the
US Model BIT (2012), at: www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf (authorizing deviations from treaty
obligations related to financial services when undertaken on prudential regulatory grounds).
39
Piero Foresti and Others v. The Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/01, Award, (4 August
2010).
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The investors responded by filing a treaty-based arbitration claim against South Africa.40
Needless to say, any legal decision-maker wishing to evaluate the investors’ entitlement to
compensation in such circumstances would be remiss to ignore the underlying political context.
It would be absurd not to consider how the relative legitimacy of an apartheid era versus
democratically enacted set of laws might impact upon the legal claims at issue.41 Inverse
considerations might well apply in cases where a democratic government is instead swept aside
by a military coup – as has recently happened in Egypt.42 Economic crises, for their part, raise
parallel complexities.
The value of the political continuum lies in its ability to put all of these potential political storms
on the radar screen of investment lawyers, arbitrators, and treaty negotiators.
IV.

Three cases in 3-D

The previous part sketched out, in rough terms, what it might look like to differentiate between
different types of investment disputes along lines that can point the way toward a more nuanced
approach to resolving them. In this section, I walk through the exercise of applying my proposed
differentiation methodology to three concrete investor-state disputes. All three disputes are wellknown within the investment arbitration community. They were selected, however, not for their
fame but for their ability to highlight distinctive aspects of the differentiation methodology and
to show how it may be used as a regime-improving mechanism.
In developing each case study, I have asked and answered the basic questions proposed in the
preceding part.43 Those questions are designed to enable a reasonably knowledgeable lawyer, on
the basis of the disputing parties’ preliminary written submissions,44 to quickly situate a given
investor-state dispute along the socio-legal, territorial, and political continuums described
above.45 A brief perusal of the bulleted questions will reveal that they are blunt, of limited
bandwidth, and inevitably rife with potential subjectivity problems. In these respects they are
very much like the arbitral decision-making process which they are intended to assist. I have
offered them here not as a final solution but as a beginning step on the journey toward a more
finely-tuned international investment law system. They are a tow-rope up a steep ski hill in an
age when everyone yearns for a heated high-speed gondola. But gondolas take time to build, and
if one wishes to ski in the interim, a tow-rope is often better than nothing.

40

They alleged that their property had been directly and indirectly expropriated without compensation, that they had
been treated unfairly and inequitably, and that they had been subjected to nationality-based discrimination.
41
Happily, the arbitrators were spared this task, as the claim was withdrawn before it came up for decision.
42
This scenario may well arise in the context of investor-state claims against Egypt in the wake of the military’s
ouster of Egypt’s first democratically elected president.
43
To keep the discussion to a reasonable length, in what follows I highlight only the more striking observations to
emerge from the differentiation mapping exercise for each case study.
44
In most cases, the information sought in the questionnaire will be available on the basis of the Claimant’s initial
Request For/Notice Of Arbitration, together with the Respondent’s initial observations in response to that request or
notice.
45
Using publicly available documents and electronic search functionalities, it took me an average of 20 minutes to
fill out the questionnaire for each case. A reader less familiar with the cases might well have taken somewhat
longer. However, the odds are good that a reader who (unlike me) had access to the non-redacted initial submissions
of the disputing parties would have been able to complete the questionnaires in less time.
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A. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd (AAPL) v. Sri Lanka: a path-breaking dispute
The facts of this case are relatively straightforward. The arbitral tribunal summarized them as
follows:46
According to the Claimant, the Company’s farm, which was its main producing
center, was destroyed on January 28, 1987, during a military operation conducted
by the security forces of Sri Lanka against installations reported to be used by
local rebels. As a direct consequence of said action, AAPL alleged having
suffered a total loss of its investment, and claimed from the Government of Sri
Lanka compensation for the damages incurred [$US 8,067,368]47 as a result
thereof.
As is clear from the description, this dispute involved a single claimant. The investment was
made in a lightly regulated industry (shrimp farming) which was not known to be politically
sensitive in Sri Lanka. The cause of action was a discrete set of events (anti-rebel military
operations) that occurred in a specific locale over a short period of time.48 The central claim was
one of compensation for physical destruction of property – a rather non-controversial type of
claim as international law claims go.
It is perhaps unsurprising, on these facts, that the AAPL dispute raises relatively few special
considerations of note within the socio-legal and territorial mapping continuums. Indeed, as
readers familiar with the history of investment arbitration will know, the most noted aspect of
this case is that it was the first publicly reported dispute in which an investor’s claims were
recognized on the basis of obligations contained in a bilateral investment treaty rather than in a
contract49 or in a politically negotiated submission agreement.50 The most salient feature of the
dispute, from an historical perspective, was thus the novelty of its jurisdictional basis.
This being the case, it is interesting to note that the arbitrators in AAPL v. Sri Lanka went out of
their way to justify the decision with extensive reasoning. The tribunal devoted more than three
full pages to laying out the general interpretive principles to be applied to treaties under
international law51 before spending six pages applying those principles to the bilateral investment
treaty at hand.52 It next took two pages to summarize the accepted international law rules on the
evaluation of evidence in international disputes,53 and then described, over the course of five
pages, how it would proceed to apply those rules in the case before it.54 All of this occurred
46

Asian Agricultural Products Ltd (AAPL) v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award (27
June 1990), 30 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 580 (1991) [hereinafter AAPL – Award], p 581.
47
Ibid. at p. 584, para 9 (in quoted para 2).
48
Of course, the events were part of a larger and longer-term military campaign against the alleged rebels – a fact
which seems to have factored into the tribunal’s compensation assessment, as I note below.
49
As had been the case in all ICSID registered disputes up to that date.
50
Such as those underpinning claims before the early 20 th century ‘Mixed Claims Commissions’ and the Iran-US
Claims Tribunal.
51
AAPL – Award, supra note 46, pp. 594-597 (developing what it termed Rules A through F of international legal
interpretation).
52
Ibid. at pp. 597-603.
53
Ibid. at pp. 603-604 (positing its Rules G through M on evidentiary evaluation).
54
Ibid. at pp. 604-609.
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before the tribunal even reached the part of its award titled ‘The Legal and Factual
Considerations on which the Respondent’s Responsibility is Established’.55
Even outside of these passages, it is striking, when reading the award, how many times the
tribunal refers to international law sources beyond the investment treaty itself, including: other
treaties and conventions, the decisions of other international courts and tribunals (in both
investment-related and non-related cases), the writings of prominent international law scholars,
and the principles contained in soft law instruments promulgated by venerable international
institutions such as the International Law Commission. The award is littered with dozens of such
references. What this suggests is that the members of the AAPL tribunal were well aware of the
fact that they were rendering a rather novel decision within the international investment law
domain.56
This part of the tribunal’s dispute resolution strategy appears to have been well-calculated in
retrospect. At the time the award came out, it by no means flew under the radar screen.
Prominent scholars quickly recognized what a tectonic shift of the international investment
regime’s plates it signaled,57 yet few seriously challenged the correctness of the decision’s
jurisdictional holding.58 The phenomenon of treaty-based investment disputes took off rapidly as
a result. Today, large numbers of investor-state claims are based on treaties.59 Legal
justification, it seems, eventually begat sociological acceptance in this regard.60
But there is another facet to the story worth noting here – one that is often overlooked in
contemporary references to the AAPL case – and this relates to the political continuum. Recall
that the investor’s claim stemmed from a military operation undertaken in order to put down a
‘major insurrection launched by well-armed insurgents engaged in a sophisticated guerillawarfare against Government forces.’61 In addition to destroying the claimant’s shrimp farm, this
counterinsurgency operation damaged a number of other surrounding properties and claimed the
lives of thirteen members of the government security forces,62 fifteen alleged insurgents, and five
civilians.63 The government’s actions thus imposed severe and highly concentrated costs upon
55

Ibid., bottom of p. 609.
It is probably for this reason that they took such great pains to ensure that the decision would enjoy a high degree
of what Richard Fallon called ‘legal legitimacy’ – the sense that the decision has come into being through proper
and generally accepted interpretive processes. See Richard Fallon, ‘Legitimacy and the Constitution’, 118 Harvard
Law Review (2005) 1787.
57
For a discussion of the award’s reception, see Jan Paulsson, ‘Arbitration Without Privity’, ICSID Review –
Foreign Investment Law Journal (1995) 232.
58
Not even the many states who were later surprised to realize that their governments had agreed to accept direct
treaty-based arbitration with investors under dozens of hastily signed investment treaties.
59
The precise ratio is unknown, since contract-based disputes are often not made public. Since AAPL, however, at
least 450 treaty-based cases have been brought.
UNCTAD IIA Issues Note No. 1 (2012), at:
http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=64.
60
Moral legitimation, of course, is a different question. There are now quite a few voices calling for the
denunciation of investment treaties, or at least their investor-state arbitration provisions. But these calls do not stem
from a belief that the AAPL case was incorrectly decided. Rather, they are motivated by legitimacy concerns having
to do with the scope and breadth of the substantive obligations found in contemporary investment treaties.
61
Asian Agricultural Products Ltd (AAPL) v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Dissenting Opinion
of Samuel K.B. Asante (27 June 1990), 30 ILM (1991) 628 [hereinafter AAPL – Dissent], at p. 651, para 3.
62
Ibid.. at p. 651, para 4.
63
Ibid. at p. 629, para 6.
56
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the few in the quest for significant and widespread benefits (in the form of improved security) for
the many. The surrounding circumstances, in short, were deeply political.
This explains why one arbitrator saw fit to append a passionate dissent in which he objected to
the majority’s finding of liability against the state.64 More subtly, though, it may also explain the
majority’s otherwise difficult-to-comprehend approach to the quantum calculations.65
The
claimant had requested $8 million in compensation on the basis of its share in what it alleged to
be the discounted cash flow value of the investment. While this sounds like a modest sum in
modern transnational business terms, in the year when the arbitration claim was lodged, eight
million dollars would have amounted to a significant portion of the Sri Lankan government’s
total annual expenditures.66 Had the government been obligated – perhaps under other
investment treaties or under the equality provision of the Sri Lankan constitution – to similarly
compensate all other affected property holders,67 it might soon have found itself priced out of its
counterinsurgency fight against the Tiger rebels.68
The majority of the tribunal made no reference to such considerations in its liability findings, of
course. But when it came to the quantum discussion, the majority performed a curiously opaque
version of a book asset valuation which resulted in an award of only $460,000.69 It is hard to
square this compensation outcome with the logic of the tribunal’s liability findings. Yet the Sri
Lankan government honored the award without further contestation. One wonders what kind of
unacknowledged role the underlying political circumstances might have played in this chain of
events.
At this point, one may anticipate a principled objection from the legal purist: is it not antithetical
to the rule of law to even countenance the prospect of politically shaped damages awards?
Wouldn’t this only encourage states to flout their international legal commitments? In a word:
no. It has long been recognized that the international law principle of full reparation of
damages70 assumes a wide variety of guises in practice: discounted cash flow valuations, net
book value calculations, replacement cost estimates, the ‘actual investment’ approach, and
others.71 What the AAPL case helps to underscore is that different political dimensions often do
64

Ibid. at p. 651 (concluding that the majority opinion ‘touches on the sovereign prerogatives of a Government
fighting for its very life’).
65
See AAPL – Award, supra note 46, pp. 619-625 (detailing the majority’s method for determining quantum). The
opacity of the method is curious for its stark contradistinction to the painstaking effort expended by the tribunal in
justifying other parts of the award.
66
Around 1.22%.
See World Bank Country Report for Sri Lanka (available at:
http://data.worldbank.org/country/sri-lanka) showing general government final consumption expenditures of
$663,654,891 in the year of the claim (1987).
67
Note that the claimants in the AAPL case owned only 48% of the shares in the destroyed shrimp farm (AAPL –
Award, supra note 46, p. 620, para 91). Under the claimant’s proposed valuation method, compensating the other
52% shareholders would have required an additional $8,739,649, bringing the total compensation claim for just that
one farm to a collective 2.54% of the government’s annual expenditures in the year of the claim.
68
Especially considering that the military offensive at the heart of this complaint was only one of many carried out
over multiples years’ worth of battles with the insurgents.
69
This came to around 0.06% of the government’s expenditures in the year of the award.
70
A principle generally traced to the Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów, PCIJ Series A, No. 9 (Judgment of
26 July 1927).
71
For an overview of how the various methods have been applied in international investment law cases, see Sergei
Ripinsky and Kevin Williams, Damages in International Investment Law (2008).
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and most likely should give rise to different quantum methodologies in different cases. It is
worth pondering whether, as a matter of policy, it would be preferable to pay more explicit
attention to how the political features of investor-state disputes are shaping actual compensation
outcomes in international investment law.72 Analyzing this connection in a transparent fashion
could prove to be a useful catalyst in developing clearer guidelines for how tribunals should go
about selecting among international law’s various available compensation methods in future
cases. One might even imagine inserting substantive law provisions along these lines into nextgeneration investment treaties.73 It behooves investment lawyers to recognize such political
complexities and deal with them head-on where possible.
To summarize, then, the AAPL case shows that investment arbitrators already have a handful of
discursive and interpretive tools at their disposal to help meet some of the distinctive challenges
posed by novel, sizeable,74 and politically charged investment claims. But when and how
tribunals choose to deploy these tools remains very much a matter of discretion. Perhaps the
principal takeaway of the case study is that the voluntary application of differentiated dispute
resolution strategies by tribunals can help increase the prospect that novel investor-state
arbitration awards will be enforced, even in difficult economic and political circumstances. This
may in turn increase the odds that future tribunals will be willing to follow their bushwhacking
predecessors down new jurisprudential paths. On the downside, self-directed strategies can only
yield jurisprudence-shaping dividends for investor-state arbitration when actually employed, and
even then, only when employed transparently. In some areas – like the determination of which
compensation method to apply in which circumstances – it may be impossible for arbitrators to
converge upon a consistent yet contextually differentiated set of dispute resolution practices
without first receiving clearer guidance from lawmakers75 via the applicable substantive law.
B. Abaclat v. Argentina: an extraordinary crisis dispute
The next two case studies examine disputes that are still in process. This provides the
opportunity to reflect upon some of the salient features of investment disputes currently making
headlines today. The basic facts of the Abaclat dispute76 are as follows.
In December of 2001, in the midst of a massive financial crisis, the government of Argentina
defaulted on its sovereign debt ‘by publicly announcing the deferral of over US$100 billion of

72

Susan Franck has noted that claimants almost never receive as much as they request and that compensation
awards do not seem to be strongly correlated with a) the development status of the host country or b) the
development status of the arbitrators’ countries of origin. See Susan Franck, ‘Empirically Evaluating Claims About
Investment Treaty Arbitration’, 86 North Carolina Law Review (2007) 1; Susan Franck, ‘The ICSID Effect?
Considering Potential Variation in Arbitration Awards’, 51(4) Virginia Journal of International Law (2011) 977, at
856. However, to my knowledge, there has not yet been an empirical study attempting to link compensation awards
with the factors suggested by my three proposed differentiation continuums. I hope to be able to turn to such
empirical work in the future.
73
This is one of those broader systemic implications I alluded to earlier.
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In terms relative to the host state, that is.
75
By ‘lawmakers,’ here, I mean treaty negotiators (for treaties), domestic legislatures (for investment statutes), and
contracting parties (for investor-state contracts).
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Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility
(4 August 2011) [hereinafter Abaclat – Award on Jurisdiction].
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external bond debt owed to both non-Argentine and Argentine creditors.’77 The subsequent 70%
depreciation of the Argentine peso ‘accentuated the weight’ of Argentina’s foreign currencydenominated debt, which led it to seek a major debt restructuring.78 In the ensuing years,
Argentina successfully restructured 91.3% of its debt79 through a series of debt swaps in which
creditors accepted lower yield, lower value, or longer maturity bonds in exchange for renewed
repayment promises.80 A number of holdout creditors, however, refused to participate in the
debt restructuring and instead turned to various courts and arbitral forums all over the world in
an attempt to recover the full value of their original debt holdings.81
The Abaclat claimants are one such group of holdout creditors. Their claims, which were
brought under the Italy-Argentina bilateral investment treaty, are being pursued by an Italian
Association called Task Force Argentina (TFA) on behalf of 60,000 individual foreign holders of
defunct Argentine sovereign bonds. The case marks the first ever ‘mass arbitration’ to proceed
under international investment law.
Feeding the parameters of this dispute into the questions suggested above brings to the fore
noteworthy characteristics within all three of my proposed differentiation mapping continuums.
It is easy to understand why. On the social-legal front, Abaclat involves a huge number of
claimants. This means the dispute was bound to attract immediate and sustained media
attention.82 And yet, sizable though the claimant pool may be, it is clear that it constitutes only a
tiny fraction of the total number of people who were affected – both positively and negatively –
by the government actions forming the basis of the complaint. On the negative impact side,
thousands of domestic Argentine bondholders suffered an identical evisceration of the value of
their original bonds, as did thousands of foreign bondholders – many of whom cannot claim the
protection of any applicable investment treaty. Few of these other affected bondholders enjoy

77

Ibid., at para 58. See also para 63, stating:
‘Based on figures produced by Respondent, by the end of 2002 [a year later], Argentina‘s total
public debt burden was approximately US$ 137 billion, representing approximately 130% of its
GDP in 2002, and among which approximately US$ 76 billion was owed to resident and nonresident public bondholders.’
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Ibid. at para 62.
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Report of J.F. Hornbeck, United States Congressional Research Service, ‘Argentina’s Defaulted Sovereign Debt:
Dealing with the “Holdouts”’ (6 February 2013) [hereinafter ‘Hornbeck Report’], p. 8, at:
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41029.pdf.
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Abaclat – Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 76, at paras 71-81.
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Ibid., at para 82, noting that the announcement of Argentina’s 2005 restructuring offer was followed by hundreds
of lawsuits, including:
i) ‘[o]ver 130 lawsuits brought in the US… seeking repayment of approximately US$ 3.3 billion in
principal and accrued interest…’,
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In the political science literature, empiricists often use the frequency of media reporting as a measure of the
politicization of international issues. See e.g. Thomas Rixen and Bernhard Zangl, ‘The Politicization of
International Economic Institutions in US Public Debates’, 8 Review of International Organizations (2013) 363.
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the ability to bring the sorts of claims lodged by the Abaclat claimants before an effective
alternate forum.83
As to the positive impacts of the government’s actions, thousands of restructured bondholders,
both foreign and domestic, have benefitted from the government’s resumption of its debt service
obligations, albeit at a sharply reduced rate. This is a net gain over the prospect of receiving no
repayment at all, which would have been the likely outcome had all of the bondholders held out
for full repayment as the Abaclat claimants have done. These facts raise important legal
questions concerning the safeguarding of widely shared norms like equality, non-discrimination,
and access to justice. They also beg moral questions in relation to certain felt social norms, such
as the notion that crisis situations should be met with some level of solidarity and burden
sharing.
Moving on to the territorial continuum, for a claim challenging the actions of a single sovereign,
the Abaclat case is a remarkably transnational affair. The sovereign bonds held by the claimants
were purchased not on domestic but on international capital markets. There is nothing in the
facts to suggest that any of the 60,000 claimants ever even set foot in Argentina. 84 The same
goes for a large proportion of all other purchasers of Argentine sovereign debt in the period
1991-2001, the vast majority of which was sold to non-Argentine buyers via international
markets.85 The bulk of the negative impact of Argentina’s actions (the financial ‘haircut’
imposed by the debt restructuring) thus fell on persons outside of Argentina. By the same token,
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Restructured bondholders had to give up all legal claims arising out of their original bond holdings as a condition
of participating in the restructuring deal. Among holdout bondholders, domestic law prevents such claims from
being lodged in the Argentine courts, which means Argentine citizens do not have access to an effective forum. As
to foreign holdout creditors, sovereign immunity doctrines typically stymie the effective resolution of such suits
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bonds.’ (Internal citations omitted.)
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one of the chief positive benefits of the restructuring (the resumption of debt service where there
otherwise might have been none) also accrued principally to persons outside of Argentina.86
The claims and defenses being pled in the case likewise portend a rather broad territorial reach.
Never, before Abaclat, had a sovereign default been the subject of an investment treaty claim.
Nor had any prior tribunal ever countenanced a mass treaty claim against a state. As a result, the
decision by the Abaclat majority to accept jurisdiction over these claims constitutes a doublewhammy on the novelty front. No doubt this is why the tribunal, in its attempt to navigate these
uncharted waters, is busy producing a record number of procedural orders and, in another new
twist, dissents to procedural orders – each one supported by lengthy reasoning.87
From a territorial perspective, Argentina is not the only country with an interest in the manner in
which the Abaclat tribunal wends its way through this terra nova. The investors’ claims, novel
though they may be, rest on legal provisions common to most of the international investment
treaties currently in existence.88 Similarly, Argentina’s defenses rest on broadly replicated
investment treaty provisions, along with the even more broadly applicable customary
international law defense of necessity. Nor is Argentina the only country bound by international
investment obligations that ever has, or ever will, experience a sovereign debt crisis. The claims,
defenses, and circumstances are all generalizable, in other words. This means the Abaclat
tribunal’s administration and resolution of the case will have reverberations beyond the parties in
dispute, even if its award binds only those parties on a formal level. Extraterritorial
reverberations are already evident in the claims now beginning to trickle in against Greece and
Cyprus in the wake of their own debt crises.89
Turning then to the political continuum, a notable feature of many of the Argentine crisis
disputes is the impressive sums involved, both in the individual and in the aggregate. The
precise amount claimed by the Abaclat investors does not yet appear to be a matter of public
record. However, stitching together various bits of information from the tribunal’s jurisdictional
award yields an estimated compensation claim of around $1.6 billion.90 This was the equivalent
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Argentina’s 2005 and 2010 debt restructurings were nevertheless conspicuously territorial in one respect. In
contrast to nearly every other sovereign debt restructuring since World War II, Argentina determined the terms of its
2005 and 2010 restructuring offers on a unilateral basis rather than in conjunction with the usual international
participants in such deals, namely the IMF, the World Bank, and the Paris Club of Creditors. It remains unclear who
bears the greater share of the blame for Argentina’s decision to move forward without the consent of these important
players. But what does seem clear is that the unilateral nature of Argentina’s debt restructurings has emboldened the
holdout creditors to reject them all the more vociferously and is contributing to the increasing diplomatic
ostracization of Argentina within the community of states. See Hornbeck Report, supra note 79, pp. 9-12.
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So far, twenty orders and counting. Details and downloads of the procedural orders and dissents may be found by
searching under the case name on the ICSID website: https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet.
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The claims arise under standard treaty provisions on expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, full protection
and security, etc.
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See ‘Cyprus and Greece crisis claims’, 6(7) Investment Arbitration Reporter (3 April 2013), at items 1 and 2. For
an evaluation of the prospective claimants’ prospects of success against Greece, see Ioannis Glinavos, ‘Investors vs.
Greece: The Greek ‘Haircut’ and Investor Arbitration Under BITs’, Working Paper (15 May 2012), at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2021137.
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Abaclat – Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 76, para 68 states that ‘[a]llegedly, over 450,000 Italian persons and
entities claimed to have held Argentine bonds for an aggregated nominal amount of US$ 12 billion and submitted
their mandates to TFA’. If we assume that the claimants are seeking recovery of the full value of the bonds, and that
the value of the bonds held by the 60,000 remaining claimants is proportional to the total value of the bonds
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of six percent of Argentina’s total government expenditures for the year in which the claim was
lodged.91 On an aggregate basis, if Argentina were to be found liable to pay this amount not only
to the Abaclat claimants but to all other private sector holdout bondholders on an equal basis,92
the ratio would rise to over 42% of annual government expenditures.93 These weighty figures
emerge even before taking account of the large sums claimed by foreign investors in the 40 other
known investment arbitrations to arise out of Argentina’s 2001-2002 financial crisis. They also
leave aside the 6.3 billion in debt Argentina owed (and still owes) to countries within the Paris
Club of creditors.94
The point here is not to argue that the Abaclat investors’ claims lack legal merit or that Argentina
should be absolved of all international responsibility for its actions. Altogether ignoring the
harms done to foreign and domestic investors by Argentina would surely not constitute a just
response to the series of events that have unfolded. But the facts of the situation in its totality are
such that one conclusion is nevertheless inevitable: Argentina cannot plausibly pay back every
foreign investor who lost money as a result of its most recent financial crisis. Even if it were
within the realm of financial possibility to do so,95 it will never be within the realm of political
possibility. Not when the crisis imposed such heavy costs on the domestic population as well.96
Further compounding the political contestability of the dispute is the fact that the claimants here
chose to make a direct investment in the government fisc – an investment known to be highly
risky and politically sensitive in a country like Argentina, with its volatile economic and political
history.
If it is to have any hope of rendering an enforceable award, therefore, the Abaclat tribunal will
have to find some way of tipping its hat to these economic and political realities when
interpreting and applying the provisions of the relevant treaty.97 Perhaps the tribunal will follow
in the AAPL majority’s footsteps by reducing the eventual compensation awarded in some
opaque manner. Or perhaps, as some have urged, it will put a new twist on the investment law
concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ by finding that the Abaclat claimants could not have

allegedly held by the 450,000 initial prospective claimants, then the nominal value of the remaining claims still
being asserted before the ICSID tribunal should come to around $1.6 billion.
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The World Bank Country Report for Argentina (available at: http://data.worldbank.org/country/argentina) shows
general government final consumption expenditures of $26,575,978,580 in current 2006 dollars.
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Again, under general principles like non-discrimination and equal protection.
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See Hornbeck Report, supra note 79 at p.7 (noting that $11.2 billion in private sector holdout debt remained after
Argentina’s 2010 exchange offer, not counting $6.3 billion in outstanding debt to Paris Club creditors).
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Ibid..
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As some commentators suggested it might have been a couple of years ago. At the time of this writing, however,
accusations by the IMF that Argentina has been reporting false growth and inflation information makes the
possibility that Argentina might fully repay its defaulted bondholders seem more remote than ever. See ‘Statement
by the IMF Executive Board on Argentina’, Press Release No 13/33 (1 February 2013) at:
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2013/pr1333.htm.
96
Note, too, that the gravity of Argentina’s economic and social crisis was more severe and widespread than the Sri
Lankan security crisis at the heart of the AAPL case discussed above, so the political legitimacy considerations
discussed in that case apply with even greater force here.
97
There is ample room for such interpretive flexibility, since the Italy-Argentina BIT hails from the 1980s-1990s era
of broad and vaguely worded investment treaties.
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legitimately expected full repayment from a government with a long history of financial
profligacy and sovereign default.98
Whatever the eventual outcome, I have doubts as to whether any tribunal can be expected to
clear so many high socio-legal, territorial, and political hurdles using self-selected interpretive
strategies. Clearly, the Abaclat tribunal must do its best if it wishes to produce an enforceable
award. But the major lesson that the present differentiation mapping exercise generates is that
tribunal-directed efforts alone are sometimes not enough. The investment arbitration system’s
architects and sustainers will have to devote much more serious attention to developing
differentiated dispute resolution strategies at the front end if disputes over lightening-rod cases
are to be resolved smoothly at the back end through international arbitration proceedings that
intentionally eschew international and domestic political processes.
It may be, for example, that sovereign debt defaults are simply too politicized to be arbitrated
under investment treaties. If so, states should make clear that their investment treaties do not
apply to sovereign debt disputes.99 Alternatively, or additionally, one could imagine an
investment treaty provision which precisely defines what counts as ‘legitimate expectations’ and
the level at which the treaty entitles investors to be compensated in consequence of a state’s
contravention of those expectations.100 Overall, some combination of tribunal-led and
substantive law reform strategies will be needed in order to respond to the economic and political
complexities inherent in sovereign debt defaults.
The same is likely true of mass investor-state disputes more generally and of parallel disputes
arising out of the same set of facts or circumstances. Other commentators have noted that
adopting mandatory institutional rules or voluntary best practices on consolidation and joinder
could help to reduce the inconsistency problems associated with multiple and conflicting
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This move would of course prove unpopular with those members of the investment arbitration bar who believe
that the function of legitimate expectations doctrine is only to strengthen, and never to weaken, foreign investors’
claims to compensation in respect of profit-reducing governmental acts. Nevertheless, critics of the regime have
sometimes argued – not unreasonably – that the word ‘legitimate’ must place real constraints on the ability of
investors to recover compensation for their disappointed expectations. See e.g. Amicus Curiae Submission in Suez,
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v The Republic of Argentina, ICSID
case No. ARB/03/19, pp. 18-21 (arguing that since no government may contract around its human rights obligations,
investors cannot legitimately expect a government to violate its human rights obligations to its citizens in order to
uphold its financial obligations toward foreign investors in situations where the two come into conflict).
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strategy in respect of sovereign debt overall, see Kevin Gallagher, ‘The New Vulture Culture: Sovereign Debt
Restructuring and Trade and Investment Treaties’, IDEAS Working Paper Series, No. 02/2011, pp. 21-25, at:
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Restructuring and International Investment Agreements’, IIA Issues Note No. 2 (July 2011), at:
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the ex ante foreseeability of the maligned governmental measure and might prescribe a specific compensation
method that takes into account the availability, at the time of the investment, of alternative risk-reduction
mechanisms (such as political risk insurance or the ability to obtain a specific contractual commitment from the host
state) and the comparative compensability of similar violations of investor expectations within other wellfunctioning legal systems (perhaps along the lines of the comparative public law analysis suggested by Montt and
Schill, supra note 3).
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arbitration decisions on similar points of law.101 In my view, procedural innovations could
indeed constitute a step in the right direction. They might reduce the incidence of inconsistent
outcomes, which could in turn help combat criticisms that investment arbitration lacks basic
legal legitimacy. Such procedural fixes would not, however, necessarily lead to broader public
acceptance of investment arbitration as a means for resolving such disputes. Much would
depend upon the particulars of the newly consistent direction taken by tribunals. I suspect a final
resolution of this controversy will prove elusive unless and until investment treaty texts begin to
dictate how investment arbitration tribunals should go about resolving disputes that arise out of
widespread political, economic, or social crisis situations affecting numerous constituencies.
Next-generation treaty provisions must address the problem of broader context if they are to
empower arbitrators to reach not only consistent but also politically and socially palatable (and
therefore enforceable) awards.
C. Philip Morris Asia v. Australia: an ordinary regulatory dispute
The third and final case study, Philip Morris Asia v. Australia (Philip Morris),102 is an exemplar
of the ‘regulatory disputes’ category of cases mentioned above. It highlights yet another
distinctive set of the many differentiated considerations that can arise within the realm of
investor-state arbitration. Here the primary challenge lies not in equipping arbitrators to adjudge
mass claims or claims arising out of extraordinary crisis situations, but rather in figuring out
whether and how arbitrators should assess ordinary governmental regulatory activities under
investment treaties. I have elsewhere described the basic facts of the Philip Morris case as
follows:
In November of 2011, the Australian parliament approved the Tobacco Plain
Packaging Act (TPP Act). The Act attempts to ‘reduc[e] the attractiveness and
appeal of tobacco products to consumers’ by ‘prohibit[ing] the use of trade marks,
symbols, graphics or images on or in relation to tobacco products and packaging.’
Philip Morris responded to the new Australian legislation by filing an investment
treaty claim against Australia through its subsidiary, Philip Morris Asia Limited, a
Hong Kong company. It brought the claim under the bilateral investment treaty
(BIT) between Australia and Hong Kong.
In its notice of arbitration, Philip Morris has alleged that Australia’s prohibition
on the display of tobacco-related trademarks has expropriated the value of its
shares by ‘destroy[ing] the commercial value of the [company’s] intellectual
property and goodwill’ and ‘undermin[ing] the economic rationale of the
investments’. It further claims that the Act violates the treaty’s fair and equitable
treatment guarantee by frustrating the company’s legitimate interests and
expectations concerning the profitability of its investment. By way of remedy, the
company asks the arbitral tribunal to order Australia to suspend the enforcement
of the plain packaging legislation or, in the alternative, to pay Philip Morris
101

See eg Robin Hansen, ‘Parallel Proceedings in Investor-State Treaty Arbitration’, 73(4) Modern Law Review
(2010) 523.
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Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, Notice of Arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules (Nov.
21, 2011) [hereinafter Philip Morris – Notice of Arbitration].
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compensatory damages for the lost value of its investment ‘in an amount to be
quantified but of the order of billions of Australian dollars.’ Uruguay is facing a
similar claim by Philip Morris, and the company has threatened parallel suits
against other countries debating the merits of plain packaging legislation.103
Along the socio-legal continuum, the basic parameters of this case look quite similar to those in
AAPL v. Sri Lanka. The claim was brought by a single claimant. It arises out of a governmental
act whose negative impact falls upon a small number of individuals (tobacco companies) but
which arguably promises positive benefits in the form of improved health to the entire population
of Australia. There is every reason to believe that the public health interests of the Australian
populace will be defended adequately by the government of Australia in the investment treaty
arbitration, and there is little reason to suspect that other tobacco companies lack access to an
effective alternate forum in which to challenge the plain packaging law.104 Few special accessto-justice concerns therefore arise out of this socio-legal context.
On the territorial front, both the positive and negative impacts of the challenged law fall largely
within Australian borders. The legal claims and defenses raised, by contrast, have significant
extraterritorial implications. This is because Philip Morris is basing its legal arguments not only
on the provisions of the Hong Kong-Australia bilateral investment treaty but also on certain
provisions of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS), the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), and the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property.105 Australia, for its part, intends to raise defenses arising out of
the same WTO and IP treaties and out of the World Health Organization Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control (FCTC). Needless to say, many other states besides Australia are parties to
these multilateral conventions and therefore have an interest in the manner in which they are
interpreted and applied. This is particularly so in a context where the financial liability of a state
party to these treaties vis-à-vis a foreign investor in consequence of the enactment of a
generalizable public health measure falls to be determined.
These territorial factors give rise to numerous difficult legal and factual questions concerning
how the dispute will be resolved. If the right to health qualifies as a widely recognized human
right – as numerous international instruments suggest that it is106 – then the tribunal should take
103
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care that its ultimate decision does not compromise Australia’s or any other country’s ability to
advance and protect that right in accordance with existing multilateral treaty obligations. In
doing so, the tribunal might make overtures to the human rights community by allowing –
perhaps even soliciting107 – and giving real consideration to amicus briefs from public health
advocacy groups and from relevant intergovernmental bodies like the World Health
Organization.
If, on the other hand, the tribunal is free to determine of its own accord whether or not the right
to health constitutes a widely recognized human right, and whether or not that right has any
bearing on the instant case, the tribunal may think itself under no obligation to consider the
import of Australia’s other multilateral treaty obligations. The Hong Kong-Australia investment
treaty unfortunately provides no guidance in this regard. Australia’s other multilateral treaty
partners are thus left to pin their hopes of preserving their own future health-related regulatory
policy space against foreign investment claims upon whatever self-directed means of adjusting
for these extraterritorial impact considerations the Philip Morris tribunal may choose to deploy.
It would surely be preferable, in such circumstances, to provide arbitral tribunals with investment
treaty-based interpretive guidance concerning how they should take into account the competing
multilateral treaty obligations of respondent states.108
Turning to the political continuum, three observations jump out from the underlying fact pattern.
The investment here was made in a heavily regulated industry known in advance to be at high
risk of ever increasing levels of regulation not only in Australia but around the world. This fact
raises anew many of the considerations concerning investors’ legitimate expectations discussed
in the context of the Abaclat case study above. But there is an important distinction between the
two scenarios which suggests that a different set of dispute resolution strategies may be called
for in the Philip Morris case. The complained of governmental action in Philip Morris was
carried out in ordinary times by a stable, democratic government well-known for its longstanding
commitment to good governance and adherence to the rule of law.
This phenomenon of investors lodging regulatory claims against reputable governments is of
relatively recent vintage.109 Since regulatory claims against respected developed-country
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governments were not within the original contemplation of the system’s creators,110 it seems
appropriate to ask in what ways they should be handled differently from other types of disputes
now that they have indeed arisen. Here too tribunals can employ self-directed case
differentiation strategies. They may choose to engage in only a limited, deferential review of
government actions,111 or they may stay their hands by applying proportionality or balancing
tests of the kind developed by other courts and tribunals.112 The ultimate effectiveness of such
strategies, however, requires their consistent and perhaps mandatory application.113
A second observation within the political spectrum concerns the novelty of the claim as a
function of the form of the investment: intellectual property and goodwill. As a jurisprudential
matter, there have been few if any cases to-date in which investors have requested compensation
for a decline in the value of their protected intellectual property and reputation rights
independent of any allegation of a concomitant violation of some more traditional property or
contract right. Still, many investment treaty texts explicitly protect investments of this type.114
This probably explains why there has been little public commentary on the fact that the claims
involve intangible rather than tangible property rights.
There is, however, a third political element to the dispute which goes more to audacity than to
novelty. Note that the claimants are asking the tribunal to order Australia to suspend the
enforcement of a piece of democratically enacted legislation. This is the primary form of relief
sought; compensatory damages are requested only in the alternative. The audacity of this
remedial request presents the tribunal with a legal justification challenge similar to that faced by
the AAPL tribunal discussed above. In Philip Morris, as in AAPL, the question arises whether
taking a bold interpretive step (here, ordering final injunctive relief against Australia) would
undermine Australia’s willingness to abide by the final award. Indeed, one may ask whether
such a move would undermine the willingness of democratic states to continue to participate in
the international investment regime at all. Beyond counseling self-restraint on the part of the
present tribunal, this suggests that future investment treaties should endeavor to spell out the
extent of arbitrators’ remedial powers more clearly.115
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Taken together, these three aspects of the Philip Morris case present the most salient
considerations within the political continuum which necessitate a careful and differentiated
approach to the resolution of the dispute. But before leaving this final case study, it is instructive
to note also one major item that has so far been omitted from my discussion of the political
continuum here: budgetary impact. It may seem surprising that in my analysis a claim ‘of the
order of billions of Australian dollars’116 is not primarily noteworthy within the political
continuum by reason of its potential drain on state revenues. Admittedly, there may well be a
psychological shock factor to the word ‘billion’ which causes people to pay more attention to
billion dollar investment disputes – of which there are nowadays an increasing number.117
Viewed in context, however, the numbers become relative. Given the large size of the Australian
economy, the Philip Morris claim amounted to 1.22% of the Australian government’s budget in
2011.118 This means Australia’s total potential compensation bill in respect of its plain
packaging law is unlikely to ever exceed 5% of the government’s annual budget, even if Philip
Morris succeeds on all of its claims and even if Australia is found liable to compensate all other
affected tobacco companies at the same level.119
I do not mean to suggest that these are inconsequential numbers in terms of their potential impact
on the public fisc or that they should be dismissed out of hand. Quite the contrary; the Philip
Morris case additional red flags within the political differentiation continuum by reason of the
non-negligible sums involved. It is nevertheless worth keeping in mind that a well-designed
international investment law system should be expected to function equitably across countries at
different levels of economic development. If the basic function of international investment law
is to promote the economic development of poorer countries by encouraging growth-promoting
investment flows to those countries, then one should not necessarily expect large claims against
wealthy governments to pose the same kind or same degree of political challenges to investment
arbitration tribunals as nominally smaller claims against poorer governments. As in all things,
context matters.120
Drawing together some common threads, the AAPL, Abaclat, and Philip Morris case studies
confirm that international investment disputes exhibit highly variegated characteristics and that
these variations give rise to distinctive challenges for dispute resolution. AAPL was a path116
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breaking dispute, Abaclat arose out of an extraordinary crisis, and Philip Morris exemplifies an
ordinary regulatory dispute. Three different sets of socio-legal, territorial, and political
considerations arise in the three cases. In all three cases, the broad discretion left to investment
arbitrators by vague treaty provisions and flexible institutional rules allows them to meet some of
the unique challenges posed by each dispute through voluntary, tribunal-led dispute resolution
strategies. Yet all three cases underscore that the promise of arbitrator-led efforts to adapt to the
requirements of different types of disputes is limited. On the one hand, arbitrator-led efforts are
unlikely to generate a consistent set of approaches which treats substantially like cases
sufficiently alike. On the other, they run the risk of generating unenforceable awards by failing
to treat importantly different cases sufficiently differently. In short, proactive changes to the
system will be needed in order to provide arbitrators with the necessary guidance to know how
and when to apply differentiated dispute resolution methods to fundamentally different types of
disputes. In the final section, I outline some possible avenues of exploration along these lines.
V.

Conclusion: toward a methodology of differentiation

The three-dimensional mapping exercise I have proposed above provides a road map for
embarking on the journey of dispute differentiation. It identifies key ways in which different
investment disputes are similar and dissimilar. In particular, it brings to the fore the specific
characteristics of investment disputes that are likely to pose significant challenges to investment
arbitrators in their quest to render awards that not only dispense justice to the disputing parties
but also contribute to the efficacy, stability, and fairness of the system as a whole. The analysis
can inform the content of the next generation of investment treaties by suggesting how those
treaties might prescribe different substantive obligations, different compensation standards,
different standards of review, and possibly even different dispute resolution forums121 to be
applied in different types of investor-state disputes in accordance with the different sets of
concerns they raise.
Applying some of the insights gleaned from the cases studies in this paper, a treaty could, for
example:


Specify that investors must exhaust their domestic remedies before bringing any
regulatory dispute (e.g. of the Philip Morris type) before an investor-state tribunal, and
direct arbitrators to then apply a particular standard of deferential review when deciding
such regulatory claims.122



Lay down procedural directives for handling mass claims; or alternatively disallow them.
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Some disputes may be better left to the domestic courts, or to domestic courts followed by a limited and
deferential arbitral review once domestic remedies have been exhausted. Other disputes may be better suited to
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Stipulate a special set of procedures to be applied in cases where multiple claims arise out
of the same set of facts or circumstances (as in the Argentine crisis cases).123



Set a total compensation ceiling that bears a reasonable relationship to the host state’s
ability to pay without provoking major domestic political or social upheaval.



Assign particular compensation methods to particular types of claims, e.g. fair market
value for direct expropriation claims, but only actual investment value or reliance value
for violations of certain other treaty standards.124



Clarify whether sovereign debt claims may be arbitrated under investment treaties, and if
so, when and how.



Require all claims arising out of investor-state contracts to go through the contractuallystipulated dispute resolution mechanisms before any residual claims can be brought on
the basis of an investment treaty,125 and require that all claims involving a direct public
service sector be arbitrated transparently at every stage (including in any contract-based
arbitration proceedings).126



Carve out certain types of governmental measures which may never be subject to an
investment treaty claim127 or which require the prior approval of all states party to the
treaty in question before any specific claim in respect of those measures may proceed to
arbitration.128

Some of these suggestions will no doubt seem radical to many investment arbitration
practitioners and scholars. This is only because we have become used to allowing arbitrators to
determine the trajectory of the system in recent years. If one takes the outside perspective,
however, the reform possibilities generated by the differentiation analysis are actually quite a bit
less radical than the idea that an ad hoc tribunal consisting of a German, a Swiss, and a Canadian
123

Some arbitral institutions have recently adopted and/or are considering rules for handling mass claims and
parallel claims. These efforts are laudable, but their utility is limited by the fact that such rules can only be applied
with the consent of all of the disputing parties – which is difficult to obtain once a dispute has arisen. A treaty
clause, by contrast, could make the application of such procedures mandatory.
124
In addition, more specific guidance on when it is appropriate to apply the Discounted Cash Flow valuation
method, as opposed to other methods like net book value, is desirable.
125
Even in the presence of a so-called ‘umbrella clause’. The need for clarification on this point has been evident
since the conflicting decisions in SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/13 (Decision on Jurisdiction) (6 August 2003), paras 146-74; and SGS Société Générale de
Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/6 (Decision on Jurisdiction) (29 January
2004), paras 92-98, 113-55.
126
On this point, see the discussion of the Suez case, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
127
Note that the much-touted interpretation set forth in Annex B to the 2012 US Model BIT stops short of a full
carve-out. The relevant portion of that Annex states, in para 4(b): ‘Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory
regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as
public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.’ This exception is not general,
because it applies only to expropriation claims (not fair and equitable treatment or other types of claims). It is also
not full, since it still allows claims ‘in rare circumstances’ without specifying what those circumstances might be.
128
Article 31 of the 2012 US Model BIT provides an example of how such a provision might be drafted.
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arbitrator should determine whether Australia is allowed, or can afford, to move forward with
enforcing its democratically enacted tobacco laws.129 They are less radical than accepting,
without further deliberation, that private arbitration processes should displace international
cooperation efforts in determining how sovereign debt crises can and should be resolved.130
They are less radical than granting international arbitrators unfettered discretion131 to set the
price an embattled government must pay in order to put down a separatist movement within its
sovereign territory.132
In fact, addressing the international investment regime’s present challenges through a
differentiated approach entails less radical outcomes and lower transition costs than many of the
other proposals that have been put forth to-date. A differentiated approach can respond to the
complexities of investor-state disputes without abolishing the entire investment arbitration
system, or alternatively, multilateralizing it under a single investment treaty or world investment
court.133 The approach also spreads the burden of reform more equitably by highlighting that
investment arbitrators cannot be expected to cure all of the system’s socio-legal, territorial, and
political ills on their own. It reminds us that it is incumbent upon everyone who is involved in
the international investment law apparatus – including institutional personnel, domestic
reviewing courts, civil society critics, academics and most especially those who are responsible
for drafting investment treaties, statutes and investor-state contracts – to continually strive to
improve the functioning of the system through all available means.134
Finally, the differentiation perspective both explains why the anti-investment law ‘backlash’
movement has steadily gained ground in recent years135 and predicts that it is likely to continue
to do so if no systemic reforms are forthcoming.136 Indeed, the principal insights to be gleaned
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These are the nationalities of the members of the Philip Morris v. Australia tribunal, whose names are listed on
the website of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. See http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1494.
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See the Abaclat discussion, supra note 76 and accompanying text.
131
This calls to mind Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977) 31 (‘Discretion, like the hole in a doughnut,
does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction.’) My position is not that investment
arbitrators should have no discretion, but that the doughnut hole left open to them in deciding how to calculate
compensation is at present too large. Moreover, there should be different doughnuts for different types of investorstate disputes.
132
See the AAPL case study infra.
133
This is fortuitous, since neither of those options seems particularly feasible at present.
134
For an argument along these lines, see Ronald Dworkin, ‘A New Philosophy for International Law’, 41(1)
Philosophy & Public Affairs (2013) (published posthumously) (arguing that all responsible decision-makers have a
duty to continually strive for the moral betterment of the international legal order). In my view, this moral duty
exists independently of, though fortuitously coincides with, the financial and other self-interests of arbitrators,
counsel, institutional personnel, and scholars in preserving the system.
135
Relevant developments have included: the withdrawal of several states from the ICSID Convention; the
Australian government’s 2011 decision to eschew investor-state arbitration in its future investment treaties;
announcements by the South African and Venezuelan governments that they intend to terminate all of their existing
investment treaties; and the ‘Public Statement on the International Investment Regime’, Osgoode Halle Law School
(31 August 2010) (in which 50 academics opined that ‘[t]here is a strong moral as well as policy case for
governments to withdraw from investment treaties and to oppose investor-state arbitration’), available at
http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public_statement /. For scholarly perspectives on some of these developments, see
Michael Waibel (ed.), The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (2010).
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Particularly as anti-investment arbitration constituencies become better-informed, better organized, and
increasingly vocal. This point was presaged by Christoph Schreuer, ‘The Dynamic Evolution of the ICSID System’,
17 (Working Paper, delivered in Frankfurt on 26 April 2006) (‘So is investor-state arbitration in danger? The answer
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from the very different cases discussed in this paper are twofold. First, the investor-state
arbitration system is playing a pivotal role in many of today’s most important international
governance debates. And second, the one-size-fits-all investment arbitration system of
yesteryear is ill-equipped to respond to the important socio-legal, territorial, and political
questions raised by the investor-state disputes of today. In short, the international investment
law system is in need of an overhaul, and differentiating between different types of disputes
along key continuums provides insight into how best to accomplish it.

is probably: not yet but we should not necessarily take it for granted. There may well be further curtailments or even
calls
to
replace
the
current
system
by
a
State
v.
State
system.’),
available
at
www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/cspubl_86.pdf. Schreuer’s analysis has proven prescient. See e.g. Anthea Roberts,
‘State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive
Authority’,
55
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of
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at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2315078 (proposing the expanded use of state-to-state
arbitration within international investment law).
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